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The Ger:rnanies: United or Divided?
by Raymond

J.

Maras, Ph.D.

As everyone knows the present existence of two Germanies is a stark historical fact,
the by-product of man's military activity in recent history. As a problem its solution
is a crying imperative challenge to man's consummate statecraft or diplomacy. In
our nuclear age the very peace of the world rests perhaps solely on what may happen to the German people. For that most grave reason, and since the problem will
not disappear or solve itself, the subject warrants most serious attention.
Let us first analyze how it happened that the divided Germanies arose. It is
a well-known fact that the totalitarian states of Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia and
Fascist Italy attempted to build a "new order" in Europe during the generation follOWing the first World War. Their plans led to the second World War involving,
among other nations, the United States. After the Normandy Invasion the Americans
marched eastward; however, the Russians had already thundered forward into the
west - after the turn of the tide at Stalingrad. The resultant well-organized and coordinated attack upon the enemy in Europe ended in the unconditional surrender,
division, and occupation of all of Germany by Spring, 1945. For the first time in
their short history as an independent nation, the Germans were overrun, diVided,
and occupied. (In part history was repeated. Two centuries ago Russian troops occupied Berlin.) No more grievous humiliation can a nation suffer unless it be extinction as a people.
Meanwhile diplomats at the Yalta conference and the subsequent one at Potsdam in July, 1945, discussed the problem of "Germany." Their solution called
principally for a tern porary but indefinite (in time) occupation, the promotion of
economic unity, and eventually free elections among the German people concerning
their political unity.2 Since 1945 only the first has been fulfilled - temporary military
occupation - but twenty years later there is still no terminal date in Sight, nor any
hint of withdrawal of the "occupying" armies. What is really in store for the German
people? History informs us that the ancient Romans occupied Britain for well-nigh
four centuries. It also tells us that after World War I the occupation of certain parts
of Germany was quite short. Both occupations, the long and the short, were temporary. Neither example may apply to the Germans today. Actually, the solution
depends on the carrying out of the final purpose or end which anyone has in mind
for the German people. After all, it is the goal one has in mind that provides the
necessary dynamism and direction.
Before discussing the complex implications of division and unification, let us
survey the historical record of German political unity and disunity down to the present time. U ndou btedly we will derive a better appreciation of one of mankind's most
difficult political problems and perhaps extract some inSight into its solution. One
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should consider that the German solution involves Europe as well as world civilization, hence the problem is more than an ordinary one. Marx, Trotsky, and others
realized the importance of a Communist dominated Germany. For them a Communist Germany undoubtedly would make more probable the Communist world
revolution and world domination, and certainly Communist hegemony in, perhaps
control of, Europe on the continent. 3 Let us review the record concerning German
unification.
.
While such nation -states as Spain, Portugal, France, England, Poland, and
others were arising during the Middle Ages, thanks to the historical development of
Europe, the German people became part of the medieval " Roman" Empire. For imperial and feudal reasons political unity, constituted predominantly of German peoples, failed in the thirteenth century. The spirit of particularism as well as that of
imperial "universalism" prevented national roots from shooting deeply and fruitfully into the soil. That condition continued during the decline of the Middle Ages
and into early Modern Times. The religiOUS upheavals of the sixteenth century compounded problems of solidarity. 3.
The pattern just sketched persisted until the seventeenth century. In this epoch
a vigorous and strident force arose in the form of an institution that became the
chrysalis from which German unification emerged. I refer here to the Hohenzollern
dynasty, a legitimate kingly house only as of 1701. At this time conditions appeared
optimum for the eventual fashioning of a nation-state in central Europe under the
aegis of Pru ssia. Unfortunately the failure of Frederick II and the presence of a sufficiently strong Holy Roman Empire thwarted Prussia's realization of a nation-state
and great-power status. As a result Germans remained divided, a condition attested
by the fact that in 1800 there were approximately 300 petty German states on the
European political checkerboard. It took the combined triple torches of the French
Revolution, the Prussian defeat at Jena, 1806, and the resurgence of nationalism to
ignite the "s p i r it" seeking nation - statehood in the classic age of European selfdetermination and national pride. It required well-nigh three-quarters of a century,
several successful wars, and great individual and national effort to achieve political
unification by 1870-71.
It is true that the German peoples missed a golden opportunity in 1848 during the liberally-minded Frankfurt Assembly to form a unified state. However, because
the movement was liberal, it lacked the blessing of the crown and the support of the
conservative elements among the people. Moreover, provincial revolutions alarmed
Frederick William IV, the Prussian king, who also feared the revolutionary spirit at
Frankfurt. The result was that 1848 failed to turn the German people in the right
direction. Once again Prussia submitted to Austrian power.
Although idealistic aspirations to unity failed fulfillment, there were men of realism just yearning for opportunity to implement their ideas. Such a one was the Prussian Prince Otto von Bismarck, advocate of a "blood and iron" policy, who, with
the Prussian army, hammered out German unification in the decade after 1861. In
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retrospect Bismarck's psychic qualifications for unifying the German people make
him the right man with the right methods at the right place at the right moment.
Bismarck's prepossessing inspiration was German unification; he relied on Prussian
leadership and nationalism; and his central purpose was the defeat of Austria and
France to effect the unprecedented unification of a new Germany. Bismarck's successes in the three successive military conflicts against Denmark, Austria, and France
awakened the "British lion" and frightened Europe. Bismarck's furthering of German
development by defeating other nations followed the political fashion of the times.
The United States, Japan, even Italy were also united in the modern manner, Le., in
the crucible of war or revolution. The nation-state philosophy reigned triumphant.
The world by 1870 had entered a new era of machtpolitik, keeping in step with the
vertiginous achievements of science and technology.4 So under Bismarck, for the
first time in their history the German people were unified under their own sovereign
state. As a consequence the course of history would be much different than it had
been. Liberalism had failed to achieve unity in 1848.
Bismarck 's "mailed fist" fashioned unity and a second Reich but at an unbelievable price. Alan J. P. Taylor and Erich Eyck, controversial historians, evaluated
the price which the German people paid for unity. The price was a monarchical,
albeit benevolent, despotism in lieu of a democracy springing from parliamentary
m 0 n arch y. Social and economic paternalism, militarism, the general staff, and
realpolitik were the ogres emerging from Pandora 's box of evils. s The mighty torrent of history could not be reversed. The die had been cast. The course of future
German history had been shaped although the details and vicissitudes remained unknown. It appears that enthusiasm of successive victories, both military and domestic, and the pride of superiority and potential, fostered in the new German nation an
overconfidence that would prove disastrous.
This supreme overconfidence proved fateful for Germany in the recent era of
the two world wars. It explains the tragiC insouciance both of the Kaiser in June
and early July, 1914, in his rapport with Austria-Hungary as well as that of General Moltke in August, 1914, when he sent his naive telegram, though failing to carry
out the classic Schlieffen strategy. As a result of this blunder, Allied doggedness and
America 's entry in 1917, Germany lost the war and once again became disunited,
pardy occupied, and anarchic. Afterwards as an untried republic, it existed as a feeble nation until the appearance of demonic Nazism and Hider 's fantastic dream for
a Third Reich or New Order. After many amazing internal and foreign successes,
Hider 's mad schemes and deeds precipitated a second world war in Europe that
terminated in unconditional surrender, dismemberment, and total occupation of Germany. After twenty years, this condition, although somewhat modified, still persists
into our times. Thus as an induction from the above data, one may state that historically, especially in modern times, Germany has not been a united nation-state
for any extended period of time-the longest was from 1870-1918, a period of fortyeight years, or less than a western man 's average life span today. Although such is
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the verdict of history, disunion is not an ineluctable fate as historicism would have
us conclude, and union the exception.
This juncture of German history brings us to a necessary and urgent consideration and question. According to the postulates of nationality and of self-determination,
principles accepted by all peoples today , one may ask the question whether or not
the German people are entitled to a national unity that is being obViously withheld?
Prima faCie consideration would certainly reply in the affirmative, that since nationhood is acceptable and the trend current throughout the world today, unity and selfdetermination are proper and entirely in order. An interesting inSight on this matter
is prOVided by Boyd C. Shafer. 6 He holds that natural and national boundaries are
a product of historical circumstances and man's activity, that boundaries constantly
shift, and that there are no permanent national boundaries. This view is further
abetted by the fact that ten million German people have returned to "Germany"
proper from areas no longer under German control- e.g., western Poland, the Czech
Sudetenland, and so on. In other words there is no unredeemed segment of German
people. Moreover, the presence of N .A.T.O. and the United Nations further buttresses the argument for the safety of Europe, given German unification. Also, the
Potsdam agreement postulated that political unity should be preceded by economic
unity and cooperation. In his inaugural address of January 4, 1965, President Johnson advocated German unity and self-determination.
The question thus arises as to why there has been no unification and why there
remains a divided Germany. Is Germany a threat to the peace? To the established
status-quo? According to Mr. Taylor there are baSically two sides to the German
question: 1) How can the peoples of Europe be secured against German aggression ?
2) How can the Germans discover a settled, peaceful form of political existence? 7
For other observers there is also the problem of integrating the entire land into the
comity of nations, a point which may be part of the second question. 8 Another but
divergent aspect of the entire problem has been put in this way: How can we (the Western Powers) build up Germany as a Great Power and use her as an ally against
the Soviet Union without risk of her turning against us? Against Europe ? Mr. Taylor
believes that such a tour de force is impossible since a great and independent Germany would have full freedom of action. 9
Various Great Powers occupying the Germanies are vitally concerned with the
German problem. So are the European powers of the second degree, such as Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Austria, and the others. Moreover, the status quo arrangements
established at Yalta, Rheims (May, 1945), and at Potsdam have prevailed up to the
present time. "The decision to create occupation zones was a political one, over which
Supreme Commander Eisenhower had little control. In September, 1944 the European
Advisory Commission . . . Signed a protocol that laid out three (a fourth for the
French was added at Yalta) separate occupation zones for postwar Germany, plus
a special Allied joint authority for greater Berlin. " 10 .
At the Yalta meeting of February, 1945, a time when American troops recovered

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr/vol3/iss2/3
80

4

Maras: The Germanies: United or Divided?
from the "Battle of the Bulge," the Soviet armies were pushing close to Germany
proper - Soviet troops had arrived on the edge of the Danube and Oder Rivers,
and had penetrated into Bulgaria and even Yugoslavia - the U.S.S.R., taking advantage of its bargaining position, pressed for and obtained the division of Germany
as well as territorial concessions. In other words much in the Yalta agreement concerning Central and East Europe was the Soviet price for military assistance in the
Far East. As a result, with the Pacific war still going on in mounting intensity and success costly for the United States, the balance of power, certainly in Europe, had
swung for the moment in favor of the U.S.S.R. The conference at Potsdam of JulyAugust, 1945 ratified the arrangements concerning the German nation, although the
United States went on record that it did not regard them as final. ll
By 1947 with the failure of the London conference of foreign ministers primarily
the responsibility of the U.S.S.R., it was already taCitly understood that the wartime
allies would be unable to unify the occupied zones into a Single Germany.12 In fact
there was a failure in economic cooperation. As a result, in the following decade two
Germanies were created and these have survived to the present time. In addition to
the real division, many verbal proposals concerning a united or divided Germany
have been submitted and discussed; these may best be subsumed under three categories: 1) realistic, 2) idealistic, and 3) the particular proposals of individu also
It is true that we are continuing to live in an era of intense or exaggerated
nationalism, marked by an acceptance of sovereignty and self-determination. These
principles have been recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. Thus by the
mere formal recognition of these principles it would appear that the German people
have an imprescriptible right to national unity. So far the logic appears incontrovertible. But there can be no doubt that the German problem is more complicated
than the accomplishment of the desired unity - ergo the present division and tension.
The ultimate consideration at this juncture of events is undoubtedly the preservation of peace as well as the fostering of conditions for a lasting peace with freedom
and prosperity. Germans and other Europeans, all Americans as well, must assume
that peace, freedom and prosperity are the basic aspirations of the peoples of Europe
and the world. Herbert Hoover's prerequisite for peace is mankind's strong will and
desire for peace. 13 Hence one should consider which conditions would best promote
the well-being of all Europeans. Presently, a divided Germany, the result of World
War II, and arrangements among the wartime allies, seems to be the only Viable,
realistic type of modus vivendi possible - in all respects a procrustean solution in
contrast to the situation of 1939 or 1871. Unfortunately, the arrangement has necessitated the presence of scores of generals, an "overkill" quantity of nuclear arms,
and the constant alert of hundreds of thousands of occupation troops backed by
civilian economies heavily geared to war. Nevertheless, since unity has not been at14
tained, the German people remain dissatisfied.
Justification of the division comes
from the resultant peace even though qualified by the "cold war" atmosphere of
international relations.
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The idealistic, really a neutral, solution may be set forth as follows. Since the
indispensable pre-conditions for the tranquillity of Europe must be peace, freedom
and prosperity, some solution making possible a united Germany has to be found to
incorporate these desiderata. Do the German people themselves believe that their unity
would best foster these objectives? Let us be historically minded and suppose hypothetically that Germany were united as it had been before the outbreak of war in
1937. For a time peace, freedom and prosperity would be undoubtedly cultivated.
As a result confidence would mount, and energetic nationalists would proclaim once
again this time perhaps not for drang nach osten, but for terra irredenta. It seems
likely that territorial revisionism would once again rise to the fore. It appears unlikely that a vigorous, dynamic Germany, enmeshed in present political and economic
circumstances, would not be apt to pursue the path sketched above.
From what has just been postulated, does this mean that Germany should remain divided and the hopes of the people unfulfilled? Not at all. The idealistic solution embraces and claims to satisfy German hopes. It is contended that the national
ambitions of a united Germany may best be fulfilled in a political orientation larger
than the increasingly antiquated nation-state system, despite the paradox of contemporary nationalistic fever. In fact, this appears to be the development today in the
Common Market and N.A .T.O. Although Europeans fear that a united Germany
would dominate the re-alignment of states, such a resolution need not be ideal for the
German people only, because they as well as the others would belong to a larger
political configuration. Such a solution, either a confederation or federation, would
have the natural and spiritual requisites to be independent, free, prosperous, and
peaceful. On the other hand, prima faCie it appears, this resolution would give up all
hope of restoring the eastern European countries to a non-Communist orientation.
This, however, need not be necessarily so, for in time these east European countries
could be included in a dynamiC, developing Europe. And if Soviet Russia 's ideological
stand continues to be modified under the exigencies of reality, a truly united Europe,
in adaptation to evolVing historical forces, would conceivably be the end result and
deSirably SO.15 By sublimating national pride in this larger scheme of historiC reality
German hopes may be satisfied and the peace and prosperity of Europe obtained and
guaranteed. Practical and moral consideration would loom foremost in German and
other European minds. Individual national interests would be subordinated to regional, even to world stability, all a prelude to a "golden age" of unprecedented
magnitude and scope. 16
The most obdurate factor complicating, and hindering, the solution of the German problem appears to be the U.S.S.R. and Communist ideology. How can one
resolve the question of unification, European security, and opposing ideologies?
Pitirim A. Sorodin, the eminent SOCiologist, has set forth the theory that as a rule
war breaks out between two societies with mutually incompatible systems of value.17
For a moment let us consider several other specific proposals concerning the German
predicament that have been put forth in the recent past. What have the French pro-

82
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr/vol3/iss2/3

6

Maras: The Germanies: United or Divided?
posed for a solution of the problem? This is an important question because of
France's legitimate fears for her own security in the wake of three conquests since
1870. Jacques Sou stelle, former secretary of the Gaullist party, has advocated a
Franco-German agreement as the basis of a confederated Europe.18 Although the
confederation has not fructified, a Franco-German partnership was negotiated in
January, 1963. Its triple significance may comprise: 1) the ending of hereditary hostility between the two peoples; 2) eliminating the German "threat" to European and
world peace; 3) fashioning a western solidarity (aided by the United States) strong
enough to contain the U.S.S.R.19 The partnership may contain an element of negation because two virile states might find it a blow to national pride to have one or
the other subordinate itself to the other's leadership. 20 From an altruistic point of
view, Jean Monnet, chief author of the European Common Market, has held that
the solution to Europe's largest problem - German division -"lies in the melding of
all the nations of Europe." Also, Paul Henri Spaak, Belgium's statesman, has stated
that the time has come for the Common Market nations to create new political institutions of cooperation, and suggested "that although a supranational federal United
States of Europe remained the ultimate goal, his plan presented a lesser aim: a confederal unity leaVing each of the Six a nation sovereign and intact." 21 Spaak's position like the others implies a divided Germany for the present.
Konrad Adenauer, until recently head of the West German government and
advocate of western orientation of West Germany, has claimed that the U.S.S.R. desires a disunited Europe and that it would control Europe unless the United States
remains on watch in Europe. Moreover, and despite the partnership with France,
Adenauer regarded a united Germany as haVing a vital role in a European federation which would include a role for England as well. 22 One may recall that in 1951
the Western Powers proclaimed an end to the state of war with Germany; four years
later West Germany was recognized as a sovereign state with admittance to N.A.T.O.
and the West European Union.
In 1952 Dean Acheson, then Secretary of State of the United States, favored
a policy of containment of Communism by establishing a partially unified Germany,
simultaneously incorporated into a European Defense Community, in liaison with
N.A.T.O., thereby channeling aggressive German militaristic tendencies into a constructive and positive form. 23 The immediate American goal appears to be the prevention of any drastic change in tlle present equilibrium of total power, especially
"through an Eastern orientation of a united Germany. It has made common cause
with Germany in maintaining the illusion that Germany's Western orientation will
be the instrument for the realization of its national aims. This illUSion has created
schizophrenia in the German mind: it has set itself objectives which cannot be achieved
by the means chosen." 24
Besides maintaining the existing division of Germany, ostensibly unsatisfactory
to no one, the Soviet government has offered the goal of unification to the Germans.
The Soviet note of March 10, 1952, "held out the bait of reunification to the Ger-
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man people in return for a commitment on the part of Germany, to neutrality and
isolation." 25 During the Khrushchev era, the Soviet desire was directed toward" an
eastern orientation of a united Germany," perhaps through a kind of" Rapallo"
agreement. Also, Soviet Russia time and again had threatened to recognize an independent East Germany; hence, the Soviet government has offered a solution to Berlin
"as a bargaining counterweight to the recognition of the East German regime, which
in turn implies a complete change in the present balance of power." 26
Mr. Morgenthau, the American scientist, regards West Germany's power as of
supreme importance in the positioning of the United States and the U.S.S.R. This
power, he stated - excessively - stems from two principal sources: 1) there are the
circumstances that have prevailed in Europe since the attainment of unity in 187071; her industrial and scientific "know-how" and capability have made West Germany the "most productive industrial plant on the continent." Thus West Germany
seemingly could make· herself the master of Europe. But it is this mastery which the
other peoples of Europe have refused to accept and which they have fought two world
wars in this century to prevent. Tl For this same reason the United States and
de Gaulle "have endeavored to integrate Germany into a larger whole, be it an Atlantic Community, a federated Europe, or a Europe dominated by a Franco-German
combination." 28 2) The other source of power paradOXically is Germany's division
since 1945. The recovery of lost provinces and unification" are the two national
objectives to which repeated official declarations and public opinion polls assign the
highest priority. When Germany joined N.A.T.O. in 1954 she did so with the understanding that her allies would support these aspirations, and the United States has
consistently done so." 29 But, Morgenthau wrote: "there is in the foreseeable future
no chance for the recovery of the eastern provinces and the unification of the country
as long as the Soviet Union is opposed to this and has the power to prevent it."
Consequently the road to realizing German objectives "leads through a German
understanding with the Soviet Union." Moreover, Mr. Morgenthau believes that the
governments of Bonn and Washington "are verbally committed to the illusory proposition that their military alliance is the instrument for unification and the recovery of
the eastern provinces." 30 Actually he understood the commitment as no more than
verbal; whereas in fact it is part of a N.A.T.O. resolution, which included the United
Kingdom, France and the United States, stating: "A peace settlement for the whole
of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should
lay the foundation of a lasting peace, remains an essential aim of their policy. "31
For some time the Bonn government has known that the United States cannot weaken
the alliance for fear of we a ken in g its own strength. This conSideration, added
Morgenthau, has given West Germany a veto over the European poliCies of the
United States. Hence any accommodation between the latter and the U.S.S.R. on the
basis of the status quo is usually of concern to West Germany, which regards such
an action as incompatible with its aspirations. 32 Here one may apply Churchill's
paradigm concerning the Soviet Union: the German problem remains "a riddle
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wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."
It seems, moreover, that the Russians and their satellites fear a war of revenge
as evidenced by the agitation in West Germany for unification and recovery of lost
provinces. 33 On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the Germans themselves
may perhaps regard such aspirations for unity as merely sentiment and a moral
commitment. But Morgenthau regards the condition as "inherently an unhealthy state
of affairs for a political elite to commit itself in public to objectives which it admits
in private cannot be realized in the foreseeable future. The moment of truth is bound
to come. When it comes, will the leaders be capable of trimming the professed objectives down to the level of the means safely available, or will they embark upon risky
policies in order to keep popular favor?" In other words, is traditional German expansionist ambition a thing of the past? This is the bold question that has been posed
and it has been remarked that only an ambiguous answer can be given: there is a
revulsion and there is "a new national assertiveness." 34 Thus real ambivalence
colors the resolution of the German problem.
So in summary two general theoretical solutions, idealistic and realistic, appear
to contain the answers to the German problem. Neither procedure will expunge every
danger from the scene. Idealism promises German unity in a European confederation
(or federation at most), but lurking in the background is the possible remote threat
that revisionism may once again be repeated in history. Realism would retain the
situation divided as it exists for fear that something worse would be substituted issuing in a new Pandora's box of evils. In addition, the individual proposals for the
greater part have the common deficiency of failing to comprehend what Europe really
is or refuse to consider the historic and geographical oneness of Europe. Also, most
of the proposals suffer from incompleteness - disregarding either part of Germany, or
eastern Europe; in consequence the proposals set forth thus far have been at best
only "remedial." As such any of them undoubtedly might, if implemented, sow the
seeds of another war. 35 Great things are expected of the present generation of leaders.
The challenge is indeed titanic. The response must be commensurate if mankind is
to move on to a better world. It is worthwhile trying - for our sake as well as for
the sake of those who will come after us. The peoples of Europe must solve their
own problems. The United Nations should encourage any development toward peace,
and prosperity. 36 Is not the idealism sketched above the true realism? Surely, oldfashioned realism in Europe or Asia is out-of-date; both it and the mentality which
gives it birth must be conSigned to the garbage can. Only then will mankind be able
to live in peace, freedom and dignity.
FOOTNOTES
I have benefited from the combined suggestions of Jozef Patyk, Assistant Professor, Department of Political
Science, and of John Kutolowski, Assistant Professor, Department of History.
An excellent brief discussion of the German problem since the second World War is contained in the
follOWing reference: Foreign Policy Association, Greal Decisions ... 1965 (New York: Foreign Policy Associ-
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time-span.
2 Walter C. Langsam, Historic Documents of World War II (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1958),
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15 A united Europe would not necessarily make for a " smaller" version of the nation-state system in the
world. It could make the United Nations more effective thereby minimizing, if not eradicating, even the " balance of power" mentality that has been an obsession of the Western mind since the fifteenth century.
16 For a similar and optimistic appreciation and resolution of the problem see Zbigniew Brzezinski's " Russia and Europe," Foreign Affairs XLII (Oct.-July, 1963-64 ), 434-37, 443-44. Also in the same spirit, see
Walter Hallstein, United Europ e - ChaLlenge and Opportunity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
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